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NOTES
MARTIN V. WILKS: PLAYING BY
THE RULES IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
Martin v. Wilks1
In a dissent from the denial of rehearing in the 1983 case Ashley v.
City of Jackson, Mississippi,2 then Justice Rehnquist expressed his
inability to "understand the origins of the doctrine of 'collateral attack'
employed by the lower courts... to preclude a suit brought by parties
who had no connection with the prior litigation."3  In the City of
Jackson case,4 non-minority employees filed "reverse discrimination"
claims against the City of Jackson alleging a pattern of discrimination
resulting from a settlement agreement between the City and minority
employees.' The Fifth Circuit dismissed the claims because they
constituted an "impermissible collateral attack" on the consent decrees.
6
In Martin v. Wilks the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected the doctrine of impermissible collateral
attack.7 The Court believed the doctrine deprived non-minority persons
of their due process rights.' The majority dismissed the idea that a
non-minority person's due process rights are subordinate to the goal of
1. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
2. 464 U.S. 900 (1983).
3. I& at 901-02.
4. Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982).
5. Id at 67.
6. Id
7. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2184; see infra notes 37-59 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the development of the doctrine of impermissible collateral
attack as employed in the federal circuits.
8. Throughout this note, "non-minority persons" is used to denote white,
male employees, except as otherwisd indicated. "Minority" identifies any
recognized minority group. The reference to "original Title VII action" denotes
an action filed by a minority employee against an employer. The "original Title
VII action" is a logical prerequisite to the issues involved herein, namely, the
difficulties arising out of "separate Title VII actions," also referred to as "reverse
discrimination actions" describing Title VII actions filed by "non-minority
persons."
1
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providing equal employment opportunity for minorities. The majority
opinion recognized that the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
should have his own day in court" required that in Title VII actions non-
minority employees must be joined.9 This Note will examine the effect
of this decision on future employment discrimination litigation, 10 and
the implications of the decision on existing consent decrees in the area
of employment discrimination."
I. LEGAL BACKROUND
A. Consent Decrees 2
In a Title VII action, the plaintiff must prove a pattern or practice
of intentional discrimination against the plaintiff on the basis of the
plaintiffs race. 13 One of the remedies for past patterns of discrimina-
tion against minority groups is affirmative relief.'4 In the area of
employment discrimination, the affirmative relief may take the form of
temporary hiring or promotional ratios or goals. 5 The remedy calls for
9. Id. at 2185 (citing 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449, at 417 (1981)).
10. See infra notes 133-187 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 188-215 and accompanying text.
12. See generally Cooper, The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the Rules of
Intervention: A Judicial Pincer Movement on Due Process, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 155; Kramer, Consent decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 321 (1988); Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of
Noneonsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103; Mengler, Consent
Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C.L. REv. 291 (1988);
Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the
Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DuKE L.J. 887; Comment,
Collateral Attacks on Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 147 (1987). For the purposes of this note, discussion of consent decrees
is limited to consent decrees in employment discrimination suits.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1986); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).
14. Under Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g): "If the court finds that the
respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may... order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1986).
15. See, e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986) (union found guilty of engaging in a pattern and practice of
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and ordered to
admit a certain percentage of nonwhites to union membership by July 1982);
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (reservation of 50% of all
[Vol. 55
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employers to incorporate hiring and promotion guidelines for minorities
into employment decisions, thus encouraging greater representation of
existing minority groups in the workplace.
16
This race-conscious remedy does not require participation in
traditional adversarial processes. 7 Settlement of a pending Title VII
action can provide the same relief for the minority groups. A settlement
agreement between the minority plaintiffs and the employer is embodied
in a consent decree,'" which has been described as "a broad injunction
negotiated by the parties and ratified as a court order by the signature
of a federal judge."' 9 Federal courts define a consent decree in various
ways.2" The Supreme Court, in United States v. ITT Continental
Baking Co.,"' stated that consent decrees held "attributes both of
contracts and of judicial decrees."2
openings in apprenticeship craft training program for minority complainants);
Baker v. Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (temporary promotional
goals with a ratio of 50% of all new promotions for both minority and non-
minority groups).
16. See Local 28, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979); Baker v. Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
17. Voluntary affirmative action plans are one alternative. See Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Larson, Race Consciousness in
Employment after Bakke, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 215 (1979).
18. For a collection of cases and analyses of the procedural makeup of
consent decrees see Cooper, supra note 12 and Comment, supra note 12.
19. Schwarzchild, supra note 12, at 888. Consent decrees contain common
elements, including: (1) statements of the existence of the underlying Title VII
action, (2) statements denying the consent decree represents an admission of
liability on the part of the employer, (3) enjoinment of future employment
discrimination, (4) guidelines for the use of job applicant testing and screening
procedures, (5) statements of goals in the recruitment, hiring and/or promotion
of minority persons, (6) provisions for compensatory relief for victims of past
discrimination, (7) requirements of procedures such as appointment of a monitor
and requirements for recordkeeping, and (8) provisions for continued jurisdiction
of the court over the matter. Schwarzchild, supra note 12, at 895-98. Most are
also characterized by the inclusion of a provision for the termination of the
operation of the decree upon motion by order of the court. See Joint App. Vol.
III, Martin, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Briefs file).
20. See Mengler, supra note 12, at 292, 294-309.
21. 420 U.S. 223 (1975).
22. I& at 236 n.10 (1975). Professor Mengler criticizes the Supreme Court
for not giving direction to federal courts on defining consent decrees. Mengler,
supra note 12, at 309. The statement in ITT is but one of several different
definitions of a consent decree. The Supreme Court has approached a consent
decree differently depending on whether the issue before the Court is the
approval, modification, or interpretation of the consent decree. Id. at 310.
1990]
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A consent decree is analogous to a contract because it is an
agreement arrived at by negotiation.' Although there is often no
admission of liability, the consent decree is based on consideration. The
minority persons end the Title VII litigation in return for the employer
submitting to the requirements contained in the decree. 24  For
enforcement purposes courts construe a consent decree as a contract. 5
A consent decree is also a judicial order.26  The court with
jurisdiction over the employment discrimination suit must approve the
settlement reached by the partiesY Further, the court has the duty
to ensure that the terms of the consent decree are carried out.'
Therefore, the court retains jurisdiction over the matter.' The duty
of the court to continue supervision over the matter and the court's role
in approving the consent decree makes it clear that a consent decree is
not merely an agreement between the parties, but a final judgment of
the court.3°
23. See generally Comment, Consent Decrees and the Judicial Function, 20
CATH. U.L. REV. 312 (1970).
24. ITT, 420 U.S. at 236-38, n.10 (1975); Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc.,
643 F.2d 644,648 (9th Cir. 1981); Strouse v. J. Kinson Cook, Inc., 634 F.2d 883,
885 (5th Cir. 1981).
25. ITT, 420 U.S. at 235-36. In ITT, the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether it is appropriate to look to the purpose of a consent decree in the
area of antitrust litigation. Id. at 236-37. The Court characterized the consent
decrees at issue in ITT as compromises between two parties both of whom had
purposes in opposition to each other and both of whom gave up the judicial
determination of their rights in the decision to reach a negotiated settlement.
Id. at 236. The Court refused to allow the government to sue for violation of the
consent decree based on the government's interpretation of the decree as
effecting the purposes of the legislation which the government had originally
attempted to enforce against ITT. Id. at 236-37. The consent decree was held,
for purposes of interpreting its terms and determining violations under its
terms, to be a contract. Id. at 236.
26. See generally Comment, supra note 23, at 312.
27. There are differences among courts as to the extent to which the
"reasonableness" of the decree will be examined. Some consent decrees are
cursorily examined. See United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1331
(5th Cir. 1980) ("The presence of these other interests (the interests of
individuals and other organizations other than those party to the suit) prevents
us, or the trial court, from taking a totally 'hands-off" attitude toward the
settlement reached."); Schwarzchild, supra note 12, at 913.
28. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 557 (6th Cir. 1982).
29. Id. at 557; Miami, 614 F.2d at 1333-34.
30. Stotts, 679 F.2d at 557; see ITT, 420 U.S. at 223; United States v. Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n, 643 F.2d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 55
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Beyond "approving" consent decrees, some federal courts have an
active role in the process of settlement between parties in a Title VII
suit. The procedure set up by the federal courts for the approval of a
consent decree varies.3 ' In most situations, before a court can approve
a consent decree, notice of a fairness hearing must be given to affected
non-minority persons and those persons are permitted to participate in
the hearings so the court can determine the reasonableness of the
decree.32 When the federal court takes an active role in the approval
of a consent decree the standard is primarily a standard of "reasonable-
ness."' 3 In part, the determination of reasonableness depends on how
31. See generally Mengler, supra note 12.
In Miami, the Fifth Circuit Appellate Court contrasted the ordinary
situation where the judiciary is not involved in the settlement agreement of
parties with the participation of the judiciary required by the nature of consent
decree settlements. Miami, 614 F.2d at 1330-33. In the former situation, "[i]f
the parties can agree to terms, they are free to settle the litigation at any time,
and the court need not and should not get involved." Id. at 1330. In the area
of employment consent decrees, the Fifth Circuit endorsed an "intermediate" role
for the trial court in determining the fairness of the settlement. Id. at 1331.
The participation by the trial court was endorsed after examining various factors
including the congressional intent to foster voluntary settlements of Title VII
suits, Id. at 1331-32, and the potential for the waste of federal resources in
obtaining the settlement where the agreement is not in some way supported by
judicial approval. Id. at 1333.
32. Stotts, 679 F.2d at 551; Dennison v. Los Angeles, 658 F.2d 694, 695-96
(9th Cir. 1981); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
616 F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounger Co., 596
F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. A.T. & T., 556 F.2d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 1977)
cert. denied sub nom. Alliance of Indep. Tel. Unions v. EEOC, 438 U.S. 915
(1978). Because the burden is on the parties to the decree to show the
"reasonableness" of the settlement, the appearance of representatives of the non-
minority class is not strictly required. Some courts invite the non-minority
groups to appear at the hearing. See Schwarzchild, supra note 12, at 919.
33. Stotts, 679 F.2d at 557. A federal district court is required to take into
consideration three factors in making the determination of the reasonableness
of a consent decree. Id.
First, the court must consider whether the consent decree incorporates a
fair representation of the charges in the underlying employment discrimination
claim and an adequate resolution of those charges. Id. at 552; see United States
v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Flinn v. FMC
Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (2d Cir. 1975)
Second, the court must consider the effect of the decree on the employment
opportunities of non-minority groups. There must be an identifiable statistical
disparity between the ratio of non-minority groups in the labor force and those
hired, and the ratio of minority groups in the labor force and those hired.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979); Stotts, 679 F.2d at 552; see also Setser v.
Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962,968 (8th Cir. 1981) (The statistical disparity does
19901
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closely tailored the remedy is to the specific allegations of discrimination
in the underlying suit.' The reasonableness of the decree also
depends on the extent to which the decree operates to affect the
employment opportunities of the non-minority laborer.' The court will
not enter an order approving the decree when the parties have not
satisfactorily shown the reasonableness of the decree to the court.
B. Doctrine of Impermissible Collateral Attack
The federal courts of appeals have recognized that the operation of
a consent decree may affect the rights of non-minority employees.
37
The majority of federal circuits have refused to allow these affected
employees to challenge the hiring and promotion practices taken
pursuant to the affirmative relief remedy.' This refusal has been
not need to be sufficient in terms of making out a prima facie case of liability,
but rather, it is sufficient if it reveals that there is a disparity which cannot be
explained satisfactorily by the employer.).
Third, the court must also consider all objections to the decree and the
alternatives available to the court and the parties. United States v. City of
Miami, 614 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1980).
34. The practical operation of the decree must be reasonably related to the
remedy of the statistical disparity found. See Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503,
510-11 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1366
(5th Cir. 1980).
35. Two of the three factors stated at supra note 33 require the court to
consider the effects of the decree on and the objections of non-minority groups.
See Miami, 614 F.2d at 1330 (standard of approval where role of trial court is
to approve the settlement agreed between parties is a finding that the
"settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable"); United States v. City of Jackson,
519 F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir. 1975) (trial court may only approve the settlement
after determining that the terms are not unlawful, unreasonable, or inequitable).
36. Stotts, 679 F.2d at 557.
37. See id. at 552-53.
38. See Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 301
(1988); Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
nom. Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Stotts, 679 F.2d 541; Dennison v. City of Los Angeles, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.
1981); Goins v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 657 F.2d 62 (4th Cir. 1981); Society Hill
Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045 (3d Cir. 1980). But see Dunn v. Carey, 808
F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1986).
The legal theory behind the refusal to allow challenges to consent decrees
is not clearly defined across federal courts. Under the umbrella of "Impermissi-
ble Collateral Attack" the majority of federal courts include various legal
theories. See Comment, supra note 12, at 148. The rationale behind the
preclusion of challenges is more clear than the logic of the law used to support
that rationale. Kramer, supra note 12, at 332-33; see Comment, supra note 12,
[Vol. 55
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justified by reference to the "doctrine of impermissible collateral
attack."3 9
The cases in which the doctrine has been implemented are
procedurally similar. Minority employees file a Title VII action against
their employer. The parties then negotiate a settlement-a consent
decree-requiring that the employer fulfill certain hiring goals. Non-
minority groups subsequently bring separate actions alleging that the
employer in compliance with the decree has engaged in "reverse
discrimination."
40
The legal theories underlying the use of the doctrine of impermissi-
ble collateral attack vary.4 ' There is a strong desire to protect a
judgment from later inconsistent adjudications, to avoid the waste of
judicial resources, and to protect the finality which should attach to a
judicial determination.4' Therefore, courts which preclude challenges
to consent decrees by reference to the doctrine of impermissible attack
employ principles of comity between federal courts, judicial efficiency,
and res judicata.4 Courts which employ the doctrine of impermissible
collateral attack draw support from three policy considerations.
Allowing non-minority persons to attack the validity of the consent
decree would undermine the congressional policy encouraging voluntary
settlement of employment discrimination disputes.44 A court striking
at 148. Principles of res judicata, principles of comity among courts, interests
in the finality of judgments, and the intent of Congress in formulating the
structure of Title VII all surface in various situations to form a workable legal
framework for the preclusion. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 332-33.
39. The development of this doctrine has been attributed to a line of four
cases: Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982); Dennison v.
City of Los Angeles, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981); Prate v. Freedman, 430 F.
Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y.) affd mem., 573 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 922 (1978); and OBurn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549 (E.D. Pa.), affd mem.,
546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 968 (1977); see generally
Comment, supra note 12, at 147.
40. See Comment, supra note 12, at 148-53.
41. See supra note 38.
42. Prate, 430 F. Supp. at 1375; see also Hefner v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc., 605 F.2d 893, 898 (5th Cir. 1979).
43. Cf Schwarzchild, supra note 12, at 899. See generally Comment, supra
note 12, at 154-72.
44. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the court
looked to the legislative history of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1986), finding
that the purpose of the enactment was to "assure equality of employment
opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate onthe
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971). This purpose was effectuated by
7091990]
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at the validity of a consent decree interferes with the Title VII policy of
encouraging the promotion of equal opportunity in the employment
arena through voluntary settlement.45
Senator Humphrey, in his concluding remarks to the introduction
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stated the Act "places first reliance on
conciliation and voluntary action, and authorizes legal action only as a
last resort.,46 In discussing Title VII of the Act, Senator Humphrey
argued that emphasis is placed on "voluntary compliance" in pursuing
the goals of equal employment opportunity.
Further, Congress has set up alternative means to promote the
policy of equal employment. For example, it created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).48 The availability of
the selection of "cooperation and voluntary compliance" as the preferred means
of achieving the goal of the enactment. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44; see also
Dennison, 658 F.2d at 696 (one policy of the Title VII legislation is the
promotion of voluntary settlements); Miami, 614 F.2d at 1331-33 (Congress has
placed an "extremely high premium" on the voluntary settlement of Title VII
actions).
45. See infra notes 111-13 for a discussion of the majority opinion's rejection
of this argument.
The proposition that the congressional policy favoring the voluntary
settlement of employment discrimination actions does not give rise, in and of
itself, to the use of the doctrine of impermissible collateral attack to immunize
consent agreements from later litigated discrimination charges. To take that
logical step, one must first assume that the voluntary settlement has already
considered the effects of the operation of the settlement agreement on those
groups not parties to the settlement. Congress cannot be said to have the intent
to foster settlements which promote equal opportunity in employment where the
settlement occurs without consideration of the equal opportunity rights of non-
minority persons. 110 CONG. REc. 6553 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey)("[Title VII] provides that race shall not be a basis for making
personnel decisions"). Where the court has followed the "notice" and "hearing"
procedures outlined above, see supra notes 31-36, the court has taken into
account the objections of those groups and the effect of the operation of the
settlement agreement on those groups.
46. 110 CoNG. REc. 6552 (1964)(statement of Sen. Humphrey). For a
discussion of the legislative history of Title VII see Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at
44-47; and Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
47. 110 CoNG. REc. 6551 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
48. Congress created the EEOC under its authority to promote the
settlement of Title VII actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1986). Where the EEOC
finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an employer is subject
to the provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, the commission
shall first attempt to eliminate the discrimination "by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(b) (1986). The
[Vol. 55
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extra-judicial means of promoting the policy of equal employment
encourages employers to voluntarily pursue the goals of Title VII.49 To
provide non-minority groups with a cause of action to challenge that
voluntary work asks the courts to test each voluntary equal employment
plan in the adversarial process.' It is not clear that it was the intent
of Congress to test each step toward equal employment opportunity in
the courts.5 '
Allowing a party to challenge the consent decree also creates the
potential threat that the employer would be subject to conflicting
obligations. In Dennison v. City of Los Angeles,52 two non-minority
individuals sued the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power after
they had been denied promotions upon successful completion of
promotion examinations.58  The non-minority plaintiffs alleged a
pattern of discrimination and requested compensatory relief.5 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the action constituted an impermis-
sible collateral attack on the validity of an earlier consent decree.5
The court, in refusing to allow the action to continue, reasoned, "Each
time the [defendant City] attempted to comply with the affirmative
action program by promoting a minority employee, it would have to give
an equivalent amount of compensation to a non-minority employee who
would have been promoted but for the consent decree."6
creation of the EEOC, and the tools provided the EEOC in assisting the federal
courts in the implementation of the policies of Title VII, support an intent to
provide non-judicial alternatives, e.g., negotiated settlements, to carry out the
purpose of the Act. See Comment, supra note 12, at 169.
49. It is noted in Comment, supra note 12, at 147, that the participation of
the EEOC in promoting settlement of Title VII suits ends before a suit is filed.
Id. at 169.
50. See United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1980)
("If the resources of government agencies charged with enforcing anti-discrimi-
nation laws must be expended in the trial of complex factual issues in every
case, the progress of remedying illegal discrimination is likely to slow to a snail's
pace."); Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
51. Miami, 614 F.2d at 1334.
52. 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 695.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. In Stotts, the Sixth Circuit characterized the dilemma sought to be
imposed upon employers after successful challenge to the employer's hiring
practices under a consent decree, that is, "the City (employer) would be subject
to dual obligations... plac[ing] the City in a 'Catch-22' position of incurring
liability for employment discrimination without regard to the action['s] of the
City pursuant to the consent decree." Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d
1990]
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Some courts also rely on the availability of separate Title VII
actions against the employer by non-minority plaintiffs.' These
federal courts do not allow challenges to a consent decree because of the
doctrine of impermissible collateral attack, and offer as a rationale the
availability to a non-minority plaintiff of a separate Title VII action. 6
Even when the non-minority plaintiff pursues a separate Title VII
action, however, some courts have dismissed the suit if it arguably
consists of an attack on the prior consent decree.
59
II. MARTIN V. WILKS
A. Facts
In 1974, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and seven black individuals
filed separate class actions alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.60 They alleged violations in the hiring and
promotion practices of the City of Birmingham (Birmingham) and the
Jefferson County Personnel Board (Board).61
The district court consolidated the cases.62 A bench trial was
conducted on the validity of the tests used to screen applicants for hire
541, 559 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Dennison, 658 F.2d at 695-96; Hunter v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry., 639 F.2d 424, 425 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981).
57. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1518-19 (11th Cir.
1983). Jefferson County is the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal's review of the
denial of intervention by Birmingham Firefighters Association and white
firefighters in the earlier procedural stages of the Martin case. See also
Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
58. In Prate, although the suit by non-minority employees was brought as
a separate Title VII action, because the district court construed the action as a
challenge of the earlier entered consent decree, it refused to take jurisdiction
over the separate action, citing the doctrine of impermissible collateral attack.
Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373, 1374-75 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
59. In Dennison, non-minority plaintiffs pursued a Title VII action alleging
"reverse" discrimination by operation of a consent decree. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of that Title VII action,
rejecting the claim as "substantively, albeit not formally, an impermissible
collateral attack." Dennison, 658 F.2d at 695.
60. 2 U.S.C. § 2000e (1986).
61. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2182-83; In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination
Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1494 (1lthCir. 1987), affd sub nom Martin
v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). In 1975, the United States brought suit
alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination in several areas of public service
employment. Id
62. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1494.
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in the police and fire departments.6 The district court found Birming-
ham and the Board engaged in a practice of discrimination against
minority groups in the use of those tests.' On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding.'
On remand to the district court, a second bench trial was conducted
on the issue of the liability of Birmingham and the Board in the use of
other testing procedures.' After the trial but before judgment was
entered, the parties began settlement negotiations which resulted in two
consent decrees." These decrees set forth a remedial scheme which
provided in part long-term and interim hiring goals for black fire-
fighters, and goals for promotions of black firefighters.' Each decree
specifically provided that it did not constitute an adjudication or an
admission of liability by the Board or Birmingham.
69
The district court entered an order provisionally approving the
decree and directed publication of upcoming fairness hearings.7
0
Notice of hearings was published in two local newspapers i. 7  At the
63. Id.
64. In December 1976, the district court held a bench trial on the issue of
the validity of entry-level tests the City and the Board used to screen applicants
for fire and police department positions. The court held the tests were
discriminatory in violation of Title VII. Final judgment on this issue was
entered in January 1977. Id.
65. Id (citing Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980)).
66. Id.
67. Birmingham and the Board each entered into a separate consent decrees
with the seven black plaintiffs, the Ensley Branch of the NAACP, and the
United States. Id.
68. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183.
Paragraph 5 of the City of Birmingham decree provided, in relevant part:
In order to correct the effects of any underrepresentation of blacks and
women in the City's workforce caused by any alleged prior discrimina-
tory employment practices, the City agrees to adopt as a long term
goal, subject to the availability of qualified applicants, the employment
of blacks and women in each job classification ... in percentages
which approximate their respective percentages in the civilian labor
force of Jefferson County ....
Joint App. Vol. HI, Martin, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-
1668) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
For blacks, the percentage goal was 28%. Id. The decree provided that upon
motion by any party after six years from the entry of the decree the court had
the authority to dissolve the decree. Id.
69. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1494.
70. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183.
71. Id.; Reply Brief for Petitioner John W. Martin, et al., Martin, 109 S. Ct.
2180 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614,87-1639,87-1668) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
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hearing, the Birmingham Firefighters Association (BFA) appeared and
72filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing, the district court
approved the decrees.
73
A new group of white firefighters, the Martin respondents,74 then
brought suit in the district court alleging that Birmingham and the
Board "were engaged in a practice or pattern of discrimination and were
intentionally favoring blacks over whites.0 5  In their answers,
Birmingham and the Board admitted to race conscious decision-making,
but argued that the consent decrees required those decisions,76 and
therefore, no liability could attach.77
The defendants Birmingham and the Board moved to dismiss the
suit as an impermissible collateral attack on the consent decrees.
7 8
The district court found that the Martin respondents were bound by the
consent decrees.79 The district court ruled the consent decrees would
provide a defense to liability if it were found at trial that the consent
decrees required the actions taken.' After trial, the district court
granted the Board's motion to dismiss and entered an order in favor of
Birmingham.81 The court found that the Martin respondents failed to
show that the defendants had violated the terms of the consent decrees.
8 2
72. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183.
73. Id. The order approving the decrees was entered on August 18, 1981.
The district court concluded,
whether or not the proposed decree would in each instance correspond
to some finding of discrimination which this court might make... is
not the question. The settlement represents a fair, adequate and
reasonable compromise of the issues between the parties to which it
is addressed and is not inequitable, unconstitutional, or otherwise
against public policy.
In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492,
1495 (11th Cir. 1987).
74. This group of firefighters is referred to in the opinion as the Wilks
respondents. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183.
75. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1495.
76. Id at 1496.
77. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183. Because the defendants put in issue the
consent decrees, the district court was squarely faced with the issue of the
separate Title VII action as a challenge to the consent decrees.
78. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183.
79. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1492.
80. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183.
81. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1497.
82. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183-84. According to the Court of Appeals, the
trial court held:
[t]he plaintiffs had failed in their effort to show a violation of... the
[Birmingham] decree. In fact, the court expressly found that
714 [Vol. 55
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court had
erred in deciding that the defendants were bound by the consent
decree.83 The court found that the Martin respondents were not
parties or in privy to a party and, therefore, the Martin respondents
were not bound by the consent decrees.8 The panel specifically
rejected the .doctrine of "impermissible collateral attack.',85 It rejected
the doctrine "to the extent that it deprives a non-party to the decree of
his day in court to assert the violation of his civil rights.,86 The court
also determined that the policy of encouraging voluntary settlements
"must yield to the policy against requiring third parties to submit to
bargains in which their interests were either ignored or sacrificed."8'
The case was remanded with suggestions for trial of the discrimination
claims.' Birmingham and the Board appealed to the Supreme Court.
B. Holding
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five member majority,
affirmed the Eleventh Circuit."9 The majority characterized the issue
facing the Court as whether, in the area of civil rights litigation, there
should be a mandatory intervention rule.' Birmingham and the
Board argued that because the Martin respondents were aware that "the
underlying suit might affect them," their failure to intervene should
[Birmingham] "does not use a job-related selection procedure in
evaluating the qualifications of certified candidates [and] has made no
effort to develop ... such a procedure." Thus, the court in effect held
that [Birmingham] had unilaterally foreclosed the plaintiffs from
establishing a violation of [the decree]: since [Birmingham] did not
use a job-related selection procedure, the court apparently reasoned,
[the decree] imposed no obligations on it. Having thus disposed of the
issue whether [Birmingham] had violated [the decree], the court did
not decide the plaintiffs' Title VII and equal protection claims.
In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492,
1497 (1987).
83. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1497.
84. Id at 1500.
85. Id. at 1498.
86. Id (citing United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1518 (11th
Cir. 1983)).
87. Id
88. Id. at 1500; Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2184. See infra notes 189-216 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the suggestions for trial of the "reverse
discrimination" action.
89. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2184.
90. Id- at 2185.
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preclude them from relitigation of the issues in a new action. 91 The
Court held that the protection of a prior judgment should be accom-
plished through the system of joinder of parties under Rule 19 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.92 As a result, the opinion stands as
a rejection of the doctrine of impermissible collateral attack, and a
reversal of the trend in the federal circuits. 93
The Court held that "[j]oinder as a party, rather than knowledge of
a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which
potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound
by a judgment or decree."'  The majority recognized that a duty to
intervene is necessary to the doctrine of impermissible collateral
attack.9" Because the relief in a consent decree is affirmative relief, a
logical consequence of granting the relief is that the rights of other
persons will be affected.' Non-minority job applicants will be able to
sue for the protection of affected rights in later actions unless they are
bound by the judicial determination. They cannot be bound as
nonparties unless their failure to intervene is said to bind them.
9 7
If a plaintiff wishes to have persons bound by a judgment or decree,
the plaintiff is obligated to make those persons parties to the action.
5
In 1934, in Chase National Bank v. Norwalk,' the Supreme Court held
that "[ulnless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a person
not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered... will not
affect his legal rights."'1° Rule 19 provides the mechanism to insure
that all parties necessary for just adjudication are joined in a single
91. Id.
92. Id at 2186. One practical effect of the judgment, however, is that the
judgment of a past pattern of discrimination of the minority parties and the
judgment of a pattern or practice of "reverse" discrimination against the non-
minority parties both may remain valid. The entity originally charged with
violating Title VII suffers multiple obligations because of inconsistent judg-
ments. It would be that entity, the employer, which would desire to join all
affected parties, as a means of protecting against multiple obligations. In W.R.
Grace & Co. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983), the Supreme Court was not
sympathetic to the possibility of inconsistent obligations imposed on the
employer. Id at 767. The Court stated, "The dilemma was of the Company's
own making." Id
93. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187.
94. Id- at 2186.
95. Id-
96. Id. at 2187.
97. Id. at 2186.
98. Id. at 2185 ("a party seeking a judgment binding on another cannot
obligate that person to intervene; he must be joined").
99. 291 U.S. 431 (1934).
100. I& at 441.
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lawsuit.' The parties to a Title VII action must use the system of
joinder provided in Rule 19 to bind persons to the outcome of that
litigation.0 2 The Martin respondents were not parties to the earlier
action, therefore, they were not bound by that judgment.'3
Rule 19 is a compulsory joinder rule in that it requires certain
parties to be joined. Parties who are not joined under Rule 19 may
intervene under Rule 24.14 Rule 24 does not provide for the mandato-
101. The relevant portions of Rule 19 provide:
(a) PERSONS To BE JOINED IF FEASIBLE. A person who is subject to
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a
party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical
matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest
or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obliga-
tions by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so
joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the
person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may
be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If
the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would
render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed
from the action.
(b) DETERMINATION BY COURT WHENEVER JOINDER NOT FEASIBLE.
If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made
a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as
indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence
will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
FED. R Civ. P. 19(a), (b).
102. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187.
103. Id- at 2184.
104. Rule 24 states, in pertinent part:
(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the
United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when
the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that
1990]
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ry intervention of parties. The rule is phrased in permissive terms
revealing the drafters' intent to allow for a mechanism permitting
individuals to join an action."0 5 This intervention rule is not to be
replaced by a system of notice and duty to intervene. The compulsory
joinder rule best accomplishes the goal of finality in judgments by
ensuring that those persons whose interests will be affected are bound
by the outcome of the litigation.',
The system of mandatory joinder created by Rule 19 properly places
on the parties already in the lawsuit the burden of identifying persons
who will suffer effects from the entry of judgment: "The parties to a
lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature and scope
of relief sought in the action, and at whose expense such relief might be
granted."' °7 The plaintiff in an action is better acquainted with the
"scope" of the relief sought than persons not party to the action.108 It
follows, therefore, that the plaintiff is better able to identify potentially
affected third-parties. 9  A mandatory intervention rule would shift
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION. Upon timely application anyone
may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the
United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an
applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground
of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered
by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any
regulation, order, requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant
to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely
application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising
its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties.
FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a),(b).
105. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2185.
106. Id at 2185 (citing 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MI=LR & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4452 (1981)).
107. Id. at 2186.
108. Id- at 2187.
109. Id. at 2186. The majority distinguished a case cited by Birmingham
and the Board in which mandatory intervention was upheld. Id Penn-Central
Merger and N & W Inclusion Cases, 390 U.S. 102 (1968), was distinguished as
unique in that it involved the "extraordinary nature of the proceedings
challenging the merger of giant railroads." Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187.
Birmingham and the Board also cited Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co.
v. Patterson, 389 U.S. 486 (1968), for the proposition that there edsted a
mandatory intervention rule. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2186. The majority noted
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the burden of identifying affected parties to the "less able shoulders" of
the non-parties.
110
The Court addressed the possibility that an adverse decision would
frustrate the congressional policy favoring the voluntary settlement of
employment discrimination cases."' The Court noted that regardless
of any congressional policy favoring settlements, the consent decree
entered into between parties could not "possibly 'settle,' voluntarily or
otherwise, the conflicting claims of another group of employees who do
not join in the agreement.""' 2 Further, the system of mandatory
joinder is as likely to promote settlement among parties to an action as
the mandatory intervention system invoked by Birmingham and the
Board."3
The Court also rejected the contention that "the need to join
affected parties will be burdensome and ultimately discouraging to civil
rights litigation.""4 The Court stated that Rule 19 is designed "to
accommodate the sort of complexities that may arise from a decree
affecting numerous people in various ways."" 5  The problems in
identification arise primarily from the "nature of the relief sought and
not because of any choice between mandatory joinder and interven-
tion.""'  Rule 19 provides means to shape the "breadth of a lawsuit




The dissent's analysis focused on the concern of the district court
that the earlier order be final, settling the obligations of Birmingham
and the Board on the issue of discriminatory hiring and promotion
practices." 8  To insure the finality of the consent decrees, however,
that the Provident Bank Court had expressly left open the question "whether
preclusive effect might be attributed to a failure to intervene;" there was no
mention of Rule 19 and 24 in the text of Penn-Central. Id. at 2187 (citing Penn-
Central, 390 U.S. at 114-15).
110. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187.
111. Id. at 2187-88.
112. Id. at 2188.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2187. For a discussion of the potential burden to future Title VII





118. Id. at 2201 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the dissent's analysis suggests that the Martin respondents, although
not parties or privy to parties in the earlier suit, are bound by that
order."9 The majority opinion, in contrast, sacrificed a concern for
finality to avoid ruling that the Martin respondents are bound to a
judgment in which they were neither parties nor in privy with par-
ties.1'D
The dissent's argument made a distinction between parties bound
by an earlier judgment and parties whose interest is "as a practical
matter... impaired by the outcome of [the] case."121  The dissent
argued that it is not unfair that a party who has chosen to "remain on
the sidelines" has its interests affected. 1' It is well accepted that
although the interests of that party are affected, the legal rights of that
party remain unaffected. 12 In Martin, the legal rights of the Martin
respondents are affected in that the Martin respondents have a legal
right to freedom from discriminatory employment practices under Title
VII'24 The merits of a cause of action based on those legal rights can
be litigated in a separate action.'
Yet, the dissent argued against allowing the Martin respondents to
continue their Title VII action. As a practical matter, the Martin
respondents' interests in non-discriminatory employment practices are
affected.'2 Granting the right to pursue a cause of action which puts
in issue the propriety of the consent decrees gives the Martin respon-
dents an opportunity to litigate the order approving the consent decrees
on the merits."2 The dissent construed litigating the propriety of the
order approving the consent decrees as an appeal of the order.12
The dissent maintained that the Martin respondents, as non-
parties, can only collaterally attack the judgment, and in that case,
there is a limitation on the grounds on which they can base that
attack. 2' A collateral attack of a prior judgment is limited, as to non-
119. Id. at 2186 n.6.
120. Id at 2185; cf Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900, 901-02 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I find myself at a loss to understand the origins of
the doctrine of '[impermissible] collateral attack' employed by the lower
court... to preclude a suit brought by parties who had no connection with the
prior litigation.").
121. I& at 2188 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2189-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2190 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2189 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id
129. The dissent noted that there are limited circumstances in which a
[Vol. 55
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parties prosecuting an appeal, to a challenge of the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court or a claim that the earlier judgment was
procured by fraud or collusion. 13° The impairment of their interests
cannot be used to effectively appeal the earlier judgment.' The
dissent viewed the majority opinion as granting a right to appeal the
earlier judgment based on the mere impairment of rights." 2
III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION Surrs AFTER MARTIN
A. Joinder of Parties
The Martin decision states that non-minority persons must be
joined in future Title VII actions.1' The opinion stands for the
proposition that the right of equal opportunity in employment for
minorities is not superior to due process rights. This proposition is
enforced by application of the compulsory joinder provisions of Rule 19
to the facts of the Martin case.
1 4
The provisions of Rule 19 mandate the identification and joinder of
interested groups. 1" The provisions of Rule 19 can be analyzed as a
mechanism through which the court and the parties to an action can
determine whether an action should proceed as brought or whether
there needs to be additions to the named parties.1' The determina-
tion that there are interests which need to be represented in the action
is a recognition that the outcome of the action may affect nonparties.
judgment can be attacked in a collateral proceeding. Unless one is a party to
the action and has perfected a timely appeal, the grounds upon which an appeal
challenging the judgment are a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of
the court, or a challenge to the validity of the earlier judgment on the grounds
that it was based on "corruption, duress, fraud, collusion, or mistake." Id& The
Wilks plaintiffs sought to sue on their rights in a manner that attacks the
earlier judgment in a proceeding which does not reflect the narrow grounds
allowed for collateral proceedings. The dissent characterizes the argument of
the Wilks plaintiffs in their action as alleging "that, somewhat different relief
would have been more appropriate than the relief that was actually granted."
Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id at 2189.
131. I&
132. I&
133. Id. at 2187.
134. See id. at 2185-86; see also supra notes 89-117 and accompanying text.
135. FED. R. CiV. P. 19(a),(b); for the text of Rule 19(a) and (b) see supra
note 101.
136. See J. FRiEDENTHAL, M. KANE, AND A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.5
at 336 (1985) [hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL].
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Rule 19 requires the joinder of "necessary" parties to an action.'37
"Necessary" is a conclusion based on the consideration of three different
types of interests involved in every lawsuit: the interest of the nonparty
to be free from the impairment of a legal interest, the interest of the
parties to the action to be free from inconsistent obligations arising out
of later suits, and the interest of the judicial system in providing
complete and final relief to the parties in the action."3  Under the
structure of Rule 19(a), if any of these interests are present the
nonparty must be joined to the action."
137. Id. at 335; see 7 C. WRIGHT, A. MLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1604 (1986). The text of the present Rule 19 does not contain
the word "necessary;" however, "necessary" remains helpful in analysis of the
issues involved in the joinder of parties for just adjudication.
138. In Provident Tradesmens Bank, 390 U.S. 102, the Supreme Court
identified four interests relevant to the question of joinder under Rule 19:
First, the plaintiff has an interest in having a forum.... Second, the
defendant may properly wish to avoid multiple litigation, or inconsis-
tent relief, or sole responsibility for a liability he shares with
another.... Third, there is the interest of the outsider whom it
would have been desirable to join.... Fourth, there remains the
interest of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and
efficient settlement of controversies.
Id. at 109-111.
A similar analysis is proposed by Professors Friedenthal, Kane and Miller,
a Rule 19 question is addressed by answering three questions:
(1) In the absence of joinder, can complete relief be accorded those
already parties to the action? (2) Will a judgment in the absence of
the nonparty as a practical matter impair that individuals's interest
in the subject matter of the action? and (3) Will those already parties
be subject to a substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations in
separate suits?
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 136, § 6.5, at 338.
139. The three interests identified correspond to the considerations provided
for in the language of Rule 19(a). The interest of the nonparty to be free from
the impairment of a legal interest is provided for by subsection (2)(i): "[Tihe
[nonparty] claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in the [nonparty's] absence
may... as a practical matter impair or impede the [nonparty's] ability to
protect that interest .... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i).
The interest of the parties to the action to be free from inconsistent
obligations arising out of later suits is provided for by subsection (2)(ii):
"[Tihe [nonparty] claims an interest relating to the subject matter of
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the
[nonparty's] absence may... leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2)(ii).
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To decide whether non-minority persons are "necessary" parties to
a Title VII action, the Martin court looked to the impairment of the non-
minority persons' interests from the outcome of the action. 140 The due
process right of non-minority persons to be free from the impairment of
job opportunities which result from the outcome of a Title VII action is
sufficient to require the joinder of the non-minority person in the Title
VII action.' 4 '
The Martin majority criticized the federal courts for not identifying
what is an obvious Rule 19 question. 4 2 Rule 19 must be applied in
a Title VII action when an affirmative action plan is a requested or a
potential outcome of the action.' The non-minority groups have a
legal interest in the outcome of the traditional litigated Title VII action




Relief which sets out hiring and promotion goals to be fulfilled by
an employer affects the interests of non-minority employees.'45 The
federal courts consistently have recognized this effect on non-minority
employees. 46 When a consent decree is involved, the fairness hearing
procedures set up by federal courts point to a court's recognition that
non-minority persons are affected by the outcome of the original Title
VII action. 47 The existence of those interests was an impetus for the
doctrine of impermissible collateral attack.48 Rule 19(a) mandates
the joinder of a person who has a legal interest and is so situated to the
The interest of the judicial system in providing complete and final relief to
the parties in the action is provided for by subsection (1): "[In the [nonparty's]
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties ...
FED. R. Crv. P. 19(a)(1).
140. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2186-87; FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i).
141. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2184-85; see Cooper, supra note 12, at 174-76.
142. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2185; see also Ashley v. City of Jackson, Miss.,
464 U.S. 900, 901-02 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing) ("I find myself at a loss to understand the origins
of the doctrine of'[impermissible] collateral attack' employed by the lower courts
in this case to preclude a suit brought by parties who had no connection with
the prior litigation.").
143. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2189 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Laycock, Consent Decrees
Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 103, 114.
146. See Stotts, 679 F.2d at 552-53; Miami, 614 F.2d at 1331.
147. See supra note 33, detailing the interests to be evaluated by the federal
court in a fairness hearing.
148. See United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1332, 1331 (5th Cir.
1980); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1982).
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disposition of the action that the action "may... as a practical matter
impair or impede the [nonparty's] ability to protect that interest."' 49
B. The Circular Application of Rule 19
The Title VII goal of furthering equal employment opportunity for
minority persons must yield to the due process rights of other employ-
ees. The application of the compulsory joinder provisions to the facts of
Martin v. Wilks accomplishes this result."W An unsettling side-effect
to the application of Rule 19 to this fact set, however, is the revelation
of circularity in the structure of Rule 19.
In Martin, the Martin respondents are described as persons to be
joined for the just adjudication of a Title VII suit.'5 ' Because the
Martin respondents were denied an opportunity to participate as parties
in the original Title VII action, the Supreme Court decided that they
retained a right to pursue their own Title VII action against Birming-
ham and the Board. 52 Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Eleventh Circuit's remand for trial of the non-minority plaintiffs Title
VII claims."
The Martin respondents, because they have a right to pursue their
Title VII action on remand in the district court, do not have their legal
interests impaired by the outcome of the original Title VII action.'6
The defendants Birmingham and the Board cannot preclude the Martin
respondents from pursuing the Title VII action. 55  Therefore, the
outcome of the original suit does not "as a practical matter impair or
impede" the legal interests of the Martin respondents. 1'
Yet, Martin also stands for the proposition that non-minority
plaintiffs are "necessary" parties. 5 7  "Necessary" is a conclusion
reached about the nature of a person's interest in pending litigation. 1 8
A person cannot be a necessary party if that person does not have an
interest which is impaired by the outcome of the pending litigation. 15 9
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i).
150. See Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2185-85; supra notes 89-117 and accompany-
ing text.
151. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187.
152. Id at 2188.
153. Id
154. Id at 2188-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2188.
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i).
157. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187.
158. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
159. Further, a person cannot be adjudged a "necessary" party where the
person's interest is not sufficient to prevent courts from according complete relief
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This application of Rule 19 as interpreted by the Martin court has
the potential to affect the entire field of civil litigation. Persons who are
not joined in an action are not "necessary" parties."'° The respondents
in Martin are an example of persons not "necessary" for the just
adjudication of the original action. The Martin respondents are not
"necessary" in that they are able to protect their legal interests in a
separate Title VII action. Further, these plaintiffs are not bound by the
original action.' 6 '
If these plaintiffs have an interest which was impaired by the
outcome of the original action, then they can argue successfully that
they should have been joined. The Martin respondents should have
been joined. 6 ' If a plaintiff should have been joined, that plaintiff can
argue for a remedy in the form of a right to sue in an action which
attacks the judgment obtained in the original action. The Martin
respondents have obtained from the Supreme Court an acknowledge-
ment of their right to sue in a separate action."6 It cannot be denied
that the separate action, if successful, will affect the operation of the
earlier entered consent decrees.
C. The Extent of the Burden of Joining Interested Parties
Martin provides that a person not party or privy to a party in the
underlying Title VII action cannot be bound by that action. Non-
minority employees must be joined.1' There is a further pool of
interests represented by other minority persons which must be joined
in future Title VII litigation." 5 The Martin decision provides an
among the named parties to the action. Nor can a person be adjudged a
"necessary" party where the person's interest is not the type of interest which
if sued upon in later litigation might subject the parties to the action to
inconsistent obligations. See supra notes 138-39.
160. If they are "necessary" parties, they must be joined by operation of the
compulsory joinder provisions of Rule 19.
161. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2185.
162. Id at 2186.
163. Id. at 2188.
164. Id. at 2186.
165. The Martin decision does not address the interests of other minority
groups in a Title VII action pursued by a representative of a particular minority
group. However, in applying the compulsoryjoinder provision of Rule 19 to Title
VII actions, the implication is that all interested parties must be joined. The
argument for joinder of all interested parties, including other minority groups,
is in keeping with the compulsory joinder of all those at "whose
expense... relief might be granted." Id. at 2186. Hispanic male employees no
less than white male employees would be affected by the operation of a consent
decree between African-American male employees and the employer. See
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opportunity for all persons not joined in the original action, whose
interests are affected by the operation of the consent decree, to
indirectly challenge the operation of that consent decree.'" When the
consent decree provides employment goals for attaining a certain
percentage of a particular minority participation in the workforce, the
hiring practices under that decree cannot avoid affecting the employ-
ment interests of all other employees. 67 The employer hires from the
minority class represented in the consent decree' 63 and because the
goal must be reached by a certain time, the employer must engage in
disproportionate hiring from that class. The disproportionate hiring
practice will necessarily affect the interests of other minority persons.
The implication is that the Title VII plaintiff must identify and join a
large body of interests to insure the practical finality of the judgment
attained.
Joinder of persons presents another problem in a Title VII action.
Under Title VII, a court has discretion to allow "the prevailing par-
ty... a reasonable attorney's fee."169 This provision was added to
enable the discriminated employee to pursue a Title VII action by
providing an incentive to the attorney to take the employee client. 7 0
Under the joinder provisions, the joined party is made a defendant to an
action.171 A party who is participating in the lawsuit to protect the
potential impairment of equal employment rights logically would join as
a defendant. The difficulty involves providing all of the joined employ-
ees with resources to obtain an attorney when the fee for that attorney
is contingent on prevailing in the action.
D. The Role of Non-Minority Persons
in Settlement Negotiations
The Martin decision fails to take into account the potential role of
a non-minority person once that person is joined in a Title VII action.
The Martin decision concentrates on the due process rights of the non-
minority person. 7 2 The majority was unpersuaded by the policy of
Walker, Title VI: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and
Remedies, 7 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 495, 512-13 (1966).
166. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2185.
167. See Walker, supra note 165, at 516.
168. See id, at 516.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1986).
170. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 4, 86 Stat. 104 (1972); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78
Stat. 259 (1964).
171. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 136, § 6.4, at 329-34.
172. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2185.
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fostering equal opportunity in employment." 3 The majority opinion
implies that a more satisfactory way of handling fact situations such as
that presented in Martin is to litigate the merits of every Title VII
action, thus avoiding the problems created by consent decrees altogeth-
er. 1
74
It has been recognized that non-minority persons once joined to the
Title VII action could force litigation of the suit.76  In Local Number
93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,176
representatives of non-minority employees intervened in the Title VII
action of a minority class.177 The issue before the court was whether
the district court was prevented under Title VII from approving a
consent decree which required the hiring of certain individuals.
78
The Supreme Court held that consent decrees are not within Title VII's
prohibitions against ordering affirmative relief by ordering the hiring of
certain individuals. 179 The non-minority representative had partici-
pated in the negotiations that resulted in the consent decree, but
refused to agree to the decree.'O The Supreme Court held that "while
an intervenor is entitled to present evidence and have its objections
heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does
not have the power to block the decree merely by withholding its
consent.'18' The Court went on to say that the non-minority represen-
173. Id. at 2187.
174. Id The majority rejected the arguments by Birmingham and the
Board that procedures could be set up to preserve the role of consent decrees in
furthering the policy of Title VII legislation. The majority was unwilling to
accept the challenge, stating "acceptance... would require a rewriting rather
than an interpretation of the relevant Rules." Id The opinion continues, "we
are not persuaded that... acceptance would lead to a more satisfactory method
of handling cases like this one." Id This last statement implies that the
majority of the Supreme Court would prefer testing each employment discrimi-
nation claim in litigation.
175. Kramer, supra note 3, at 352-56; see Local 93, Int'l Assn. of Firefighters
v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 530 (1986).
176. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
177. Id. at 3067. The representative, Local Number 93 of the International
Association of Firefighters intervened as party plaintiff. Id
178. Id. at 3070.
179. Id at 3071. The non-minority representative had argued that 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g) prohibited the district court from entering the order
approving the consent decree because § 2000e-5(g) provides that "no order of the
court shall require... hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as
an employee." Id (citing 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) (1986)).
180. Local 93, 478 U.S. at 3068.
181. Id at 3079 (citing for support Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455
U.S. 385 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 711
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tative could succeed in blocking the consent decree's approval if it based
the refusal to agree on "valid claims.'
8 2
The inability of the non-minority intervenor to block the entry of
the consent decree in Local 93 does not reflect the probable outcome of
Title VII actions after Martin. The decision in Martin recognizes the
due process right of the non-minority person to be joined in a Title VII
action."s Although the majority opinion does not explicitly connect
that due process right to an identifiable legal interest to be protect-
ed,' the right to participate must involve the existence of a legal
interest to be defended." One commentator suggests that the
existence of a non-minority defendant in the Title VII action would
create a trilateral action and the focus of the issues would be on the
allocation of a limited pool of employment positions between the
minority plaintiff and the non-minority defendant employee.'a In this
scenario, the right of the non-minority party to those positions would be
essentially the same as the right of the minority persons.
18 7
IV. OPERATION OF CONSENT DECREES AFTER MARTIN
The Martin decision affects the validity of consent decrees presently
relied upon by employers. In both the majority opinion and the opinion
of the Eleventh Circuit, an issue was the effect the trial court had given
the consent decree at trial."s  That issue was not presented for
F.2d 1117, 1126 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984)).
182. Id. at 3079.
183. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2185.
184. Rather, the due process right is discussed in terms of a right to be
heard.
185. If one has no legal interest to be affected in a suit, certainly, one has
no due process right to be joined under the compulsory joinder provisions of Rule
19.
186. Laycock, supra note 12, at 109.
187. Id.
188. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2186; In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination
Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1497 (1987). The trial at the district court
level was centered around the issue of whether Birmingham and the Board had
acted in accordance with the consent decrees in the hiring and promoting
practices they had pursued. Id. Specifically, the trial court focused on
paragraph 2 of the City consent decree, which provides:
Nothing herein shall be interpreted as requiring the City to hire
unnecessary personnel, or to hire, transfer, or promote a person, who
is not qualified, or to hire, transfer, or promote a less qualified person,
in preference to a person who is demonstrably better qualified based
upon the results of a job related selection procedure.
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review by the Supreme Court.'89 The role played by a consent decree
in a non-minority Title VII action is a question left to the district courts.
There are several possible roles for a prior entered consent decree to
play in a "reverse" discrimination Title VII action.
At the trial level, the consent decrees were a defense to the charge
of discrimination by the Martin respondents. The decrees were
examined to determine if Birmingham and the Board were required to
make the promotions which the Martin respondents alleged were
discriminatory conduct.19° The district court recognized that the
injury suffered by the Martin respondents arose by operation of the
consent decrees. According to the district court, Birmingham and the
Board escaped liability for the injury of the minority groups by following
the mandate of the consent decrees. 9' If they could not escape
liability for the injury of the non-minority groups by following the
requirements of the consent decrees, Birmingham and Board would be
liable, in effect, for compliance with the order of the district court.
Thus, one possible role for an earlier entered consent decree in a
"reverse" discrimination action is the use of the consent decree as a
"good faith" defense to liability.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that the consent
decree should be analyzed using the standard set out by the Supreme
Court for determining the validity of voluntary affirmative action
plans.' 9  In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 9 3 the Supreme
Court ruled on the validity of a voluntary affirmative action plan
instituted by the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency.'9 A
male employee challenged that plan after he had been denied a
promotion in favor of a marginally less qualified female.'9 5 The Court
held that the burden of proving discrimination is on the non-minority
The focus on the issue of Birmingham and the Board's compliance with this
paragraph of the consent decree, rather than the merits of the Wilks plaintiffs'
charge of discrimination, gave rise to the conclusion by the Eleventh Circuit, and
the majority of the Supreme Court, that the district court "treated the plaintiffs
as if they were bound by the consent decrees." Id at 1496; see Martin, 109 S.
Ct. at 2186 n.6. ("if [the consent decree] is a defense to challenges to employ-
ment practices which would otherwise violate Title VII, it is very difficult to see
why respondents are not being 'bound' by the decree").
189. Brief of Respondents Robert K. Wilks, et al., Martin, 109 S.Ct. 2180
(1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
190. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1496-97.
191. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2184.
192. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1500-01.
193. 408 U.S. 616 (1987).
194. Id- at 1446.
195. Id- at 1448.
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plaintiff when an employer has defended the hiring actions by reference
to an affirmative action plan.'9 The plaintiff must show that the plan
was not "justified by the existence of a 'manifest imbalance' that
reflected underrepresentation of [the minority group] in 'traditionally
segregated job categories." 9 7 The plaintiff also must show that the
rights of nonminorities are "unnecessarily trammelled]."' The
plaintiff may satisfy the burden of proving this second element by
showing that the affirmative action plan is a pretextual justification
relied on by the employer." This may be shown by pointing to
requirements in the plan such as the discharge of nonminorities to
provide jobs for the minorities, or by pointing out that the plan
represents an absolute bar to the advancement of the nonminorities.2 °
An earlier entered consent decree is construed as a voluntary affirma-
tive action plan for the purposes of a "reverse" discrimination action,
and could be evaluated accordingly.
The Supreme Court did not have before it the issue whether the
Johnson standard was the appropriate means to evaluate a "reverse
discrimination" action.2° ' On remand, the district court will apply the
Johnson standard for trial of the Martin respondents' claims. °2 There
are other ways to frame the issue of the consent decree's role in a
"reverse discrimination" action.
The majority opinion in Martin stated that "the proceedings in the
District Court may have been affected by the mistaken view that
respondents' claims on the merits were barred to the extent they were
inconsistent with the consent decree."20 3 As a practical matter, the
196. Id at 1449.
197. Id. at 1452 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197
(1979)). Weber addressed the question of whether the instigation of a voluntary
affirmative action plan was prohibited by Title VII. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
The Court held that voluntary affirmative action was not prohibited stating,
It would be ironic indeed if a lawtriggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those
who had 'been excluded from the American dream for so long'
constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private,
race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segrega-
tion and hierarchy.
Id at 204 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
198. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451.
199. Id. at 1449.
200. Id at 1451 (citing Weber, 443 U.S. at 208).
201. Brief of Respondents Robert K. Wilks, et al., Martin, 109 S. Ct. 2180
(1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
202. In reBirminghamReverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d
1492, 1500 (1987).
203. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2188.
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consent decree was the guide by which the allegedly discriminatory
hiring and promotion practices were conducted. The majority pointed
out that the trial proceeded with the assumption that the defendants
Birmingham and the Board could escape liability for discriminatory
employment practices if it was found they complied with the require-
ments of the consent decrees. 2°4 Therefore, the opinion suggests that
the allegedly discriminatory practices should be examined without
reference to the consent decrees. 2 5 This implies then that defendants
may have to defend the consent decrees under a standard more strict
than the Johnson test. Perhaps even the original determination of the
propriety of the decrees themselves will be the focus of the issues
litigated at trial. An earlier entered consent decree could be irrelevant
in a "reverse" discrimination action; a "reverse" discrimination action
could be tried without reference to any existing affirmative action plan.
The issues of a "reverse" discrimination claim also could be
examined under the framework suggested by the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. City of Miami.2" In Miami, the court affirmed the trial
court's entry of an order approving a consent decree.0 7 The opinion
discussed the standard of approval applicable for settlement agreements
in other areas of the law.2 ' The trial court must examine the
settlement to insure that its terms "are not unlawful, unreasonable, or
inequitable."2' The standard espoused by the court in Miami is
204. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2186.
205. In footnote six, Rehnquist states "either the fact that the disputed
employment decisions are being made pursuant to a consent decree is a defense
to [the Wilks plaintiffs'] Title VII claims or it is not." 1d. at 2186 n.6. Because
the majority decides that the Wilks plaintiffs are not bound by the decree, the
fact that the employment decisions are made pursuant to the decrees is not a
defense to the charges of discrimination. The reasons for the employment
decisions must be examined under all the circumstances, including perhaps, the
original impetus to entering into the consent decrees. This last amounts to a re-
evaluation of the original claims of the minority plaintiffs and the negotiations
which led to settlement.
206. 614 F.2d 1322 (1980), modified in part, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981).
207. Id. at 1342.
208. Id. at 1330. The opinion noted first that the approval by a trial court
of a settlement agreement between parties occurred only where "by statute or
rule [the court is required] to approve a settlement to which the parties to the
litigation have agreed." Id. "The three most prevalent examples of this are
proposed class action settlements, proposed shareholder derivative suit
settlements, and proposed compromises of claims in bankruptcy court." Id.
209. Id. (citing for reference United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147,
1151 (5th Cir. 1975)). The opinion states that the standard is the same although
some courts have phrased it negatively, as quoted, and some have stated it
positively: "the trial court must find that the settlement is fair, adequate, and
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essentially the test for approval used by federal courts in "fairness"
hearings."0 The Miami court would require a less active role in
examining the settlement when the EEOC or the Justice Department
is a party to the original agreement."' The Miami test would impose
a burden on the plaintiff in the "reverse discrimination" action to show
that the consent decree is unlawful because it is inequitable, unreason-
able, or unlawful. Under this test, the elements of the Title VII action
still must be met. This standard is less strict than the Johnson test.
In Martin, the dissents main concern was the finality which should
attach to the prior judgment of the trial court. 2  The dissentnoted
that the "type of race-conscious relief ordered in the consent decree is
entirely consistent with this Courts approach to affirmative action.
213
The dissent would allow the Martin respondents a cause of action to
pursue their Title VII claims, but limit the action to a collateral attack
on the earlier judgment. 14 Under this rule, the consent decrees would
remain operative. Defendant employers would be immune from liability
for employment practices unless the trial court found that the earlier
judgment had been entered in the absence of proper jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or "if the judgment [was] the product of corruption,
duress, fraud, collusion, or mistake."215 The dissent's suggestion on
the role of the consent decree in a "reverse discrimination" action would
establish the highest burden of proof on the plaintiffs.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in Martin v. Wilks makes clear the procedural
prerequisites necessary for finality in Title VII consent decree settle-
ments. Parties to the Title VII suit must join non-minority employees
as parties. This requirement was imposed by a recognition that the due
process rights of the non-minority persons are at least equal to the right
to equal employment opportunity of the minority plaintiff. The Martin
majority rejected the contention that it is the obligation of the courts to
provide a procedure which would satisfy the due process considerations
without impairment of the progress of Title VII goals.
reasonable." Id. (citing for reference Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th
Cir. 1977); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971)).
210. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
211. Miami, 614 F.2d at 1332-33.
212. See supra notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
213. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The net effect of the Martin opinion is to erect procedural and
practical hurdles for persons seeking relief from discriminatory
employment practices.216 By requiring joinder of non-minority persons
in the Title VII action, the Martin majority created the possibility that
all Title VII actions will proceed to trial.217 In this way, the decision
delays the realization of equal opportunity in the workplace through
greater participation of the judicial system in the remediation of
discrimination.
The Martin decision placed a different obstacle in the path of
persons who have already secured relief in the form of a consent decree.
The Martin decision held that consent decrees entered into without
participation of "necessary" parties are subject to challenges from those
persons in the form of separate Title VII actions. The next issue for the
Supreme Court in this area will concern the nature of a Title VII action
which alleges "reverse discrimination" resulting from the operation of
a consent decree.1 8 It is not clear that the merits of the original Title
VII action will not be relitigated .2 " For the defendant employers and
the minority employees, the long process of obtaining the relief provided
for under Title VII might begin again. In 1974, minority employees, the
City of Birmingham, and the Jefferson County Board began a process
of remedying past discrimination. In 1989, that process continues.
MATrHEW J. FAiRLESS
216. See supra notes 133-88 for a discussion of the effect of the Martin
decision on future Title VII actions.
217. See supra notes 172-87 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 188-215 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
issue.
219. See supra notes 203-15 and accompanying text.
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